Research library

Constitution and Cases on Federal Clemency

This page collects the constitutional text of the federal pardon power and short, footnoted stubs for core Supreme Court decisions. Case sections stay on this index for Phase 1 so we do not ship thin standalone pages; deeper articles are planned later. Nothing here is legal advice.

Article II, Section 2, Clause 1

The Constitution gives the President power to “grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.” That clause is the textual home of federal executive clemency. It covers offenses against the United States; it does not grant the President authority over state crimes.

Primary text: U.S. Constitution, Article II (Cornell LII). DOJ’s Office of the Pardon Attorney administers clemency petitions for the President under regulations in 28 C.F.R. part 1.

Ex parte Garland

71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866)

The Court described the President’s pardon power as broad for offenses against the United States, extending to every offense known to the law and exercisable before or after conviction, subject to the impeachment exception in the text of Article II. The case arose from a post–Civil War test-oath statute as applied to a former Confederate legislator seeking to resume law practice in federal court.

Opinion: Ex parte Garland on Cornell LII.

United States v. Wilson

32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150 (1833)

Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion treated a pardon as a deed that must be accepted to be effective in the posture of that case. Later cases refine how acceptance interacts with commutations and other forms of clemency; read Wilson together with Burdick and Biddle rather than in isolation.

Opinion: United States v. Wilson on Cornell LII.

United States v. Klein

80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871)

Klein is a Reconstruction-era decision often cited for limits on Congress’s ability to prescribe rules of decision that nullify the effect of a presidential pardon in pending cases. The opinion discusses separation of powers in the context of captured-property claims and pardons proving loyalty.

Opinion: United States v. Klein on Cornell LII.

Burdick v. United States

236 U.S. 79 (1915)

Burdick concerns a witness who refused a presidential pardon offered so that he would testify. The Court discussed the pardon as requiring acceptance and as carrying implications the recipient may decline. Compare later treatment of commutations in Biddle.

Opinion: Burdick v. United States on Cornell LII.

Biddle v. Perovich

274 U.S. 480 (1927)

The Court upheld a commutation of a death sentence to life imprisonment without the prisoner’s consent in the circumstances of that case, distinguishing the acceptance discussion in Burdick as applied to that form of relief.

Opinion: Biddle v. Perovich on Cornell LII.

Schick v. Reed

419 U.S. 256 (1974)

Schick upheld a conditional commutation of a death sentence to life imprisonment without parole. The Court grounded the conditional commutation in the Article II power and rejected the argument that the condition was invalid under later capital-sentencing developments in that litigation’s posture.

Opinion: Schick v. Reed on Cornell LII.

For practice-facing explanations of pardons and commutations, see the clemency guide and source directory.

By Brandon Sample

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